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The Law and Economics of Contract Damages
Douglas G. Baird†

Those of us who study contracts tend to forget that most people keep the
promises they make. Contract law matters because of the way it affects the
behavior of everyone who enters into a contract, not just those who end up in
court. In this talk, I want to show that law and economics is useful for exactly this
reason. It helps us to identify the effects that legal rules have on behavior.
I.
Let’s start with a well-known case and a discrete problem of contract
damages. The case is Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochrane.1 The problem is measuring
damages in the case of anticipatory breach.2 The time is 1880. In early January,
Cochrane promises to deliver 100 tons of coke to Missouri Furnace every
working day of the year at a price of $1.20 a ton. There is a sudden rise in the
price of coke in January and Cochrane breaches the contract in mid-February.
Missouri Furnace immediately enters into a substantially similar contract with a
different seller, but at the much higher price of $4 a ton.
This $4-per-ton price is less than the spot price for coke in February and it is
the prevailing price for a forward contract in February. The spot price of coke,
however, later falls far below $4. If Missouri Furnace had waited and purchased
†

Harry A. Bigelow Professor of Law and Dean.
This paper was given as a Coase Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School in February
1994. The purpose of the series is make the principles of law and economics readily accessible to a
lay audience. Law and economics scholars will find the ideas presented here familiar. This paper
tries to distill the essence of the work of Richard Posner, William Landes, Steven Shavell, Ian
Ayres, Robert Gertner, Thomas Jackson, and others. There are many important contributions that
I do not cover explicitly. Given the state of the literature, this paper tries only to set out some
basic landmarks.
One of the seminal treatments of contract damages remains Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law §4.8, at 117-28 (4th ed. 1992). Other work has also made important contributions.
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Transactions: Principles and Policies 323-25 (1982).

2

The Elements of Bankruptcy

coke throughout the year on the spot market it would have paid on average
substantially less than $4 a ton for its coke.
Missouri Furnace argued that later changes in the price were irrelevant. It
was entitled to the difference between the contract price of $1.20 and $4, the price
of the forward contract at the time of the breach. Cochrane argued that Missouri
Furnace was taking its chances when it entered into another forward contract. In
its view, Missouri Furnace was entitled only to the difference between $1.20 and
the spot price for the coke at the time it was to be delivered.
The court agreed with Cochrane and held that Missouri Furnace was not
entitled to recover for the costs of entering into the forward contract that
subsequently proved unfavorable:
[Missouri Furnace was] not bound to enter into such a contract, which
might be to [its] advantage or detriment, according as the market might
fall or rise. If it fell, [Cochrane] might fairly say that [Missouri Furnace]
had no right to enter into a speculative contract, and [Cochrane might
fairly] insist that he was not called upon to pay a greater difference than
would have existed had [Missouri Furnace] held its hand. . . . As
[Missouri Furnace] was not bound to enter into the new forward
contract, . . . it did so at its own risk.
I want to use the tools to law and economics to examine whether the court’s
ruling in Missouri Furnace is consistent with its own first principles. The court in
Missouri Furnace, like common law courts generally, accepts what is now called
the expectation damages principle. The aggrieved party is entitled to those
damages that put it in the same position that it would be in if the breach had not
taken place. As the Uniform Commercial Code tells us in §1-106, remedies for
breach of contract are to be “liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.”
Is the decision in Missouri Furnace consistent with this idea?
Our intuition probably tells us that there is something suspect about what the
court did. The day before Missouri Furnace breached, it had Cochrane’s promise
to take care of all its needs for coke for the whole year in exchange for its promise
to pay $1.20 a ton. After Cochrane breached, Missouri Furnace had to promise to
pay $4 a ton to get someone else to promise to do the same thing—to satisfy its
need for coke for the entire year. To put Missouri Furnace in the same position it
had been in before Cochrane broke its promise, it would seem Missouri Furnace
needs damages based on the difference between $4 and $1.20.
Missouri Furnace entered into its contract with Cochrane in the first place
because it had decided not to buy on the spot market. Missouri Furnace
bargained for the benefit of a forward contract. To make Missouri Furnace whole,
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the right question is how much more it would cost to enter into a forward
contract with another seller.
The court in Missouri Furnace had it exactly backwards. Missouri Furnace did
not want to speculate on the price of coke. It wanted to pay a fixed price for the
coke. For that reason Missouri Furnace bargained for a forward contract with
Cochrane and it is that benefit which it lost when Cochrane broke his contract.
We cannot stop our analysis here, however. In many cases, there won’t be a
forward market that the buyer can reenter. It may be much easier to figure out
the spot price than the forward price. Even if the forward contract measure is
conceptually correct, is there anything the matter with the spot price measure?
The price could be higher or lower, but is there anything systematically wrong
with it? After all, once this rule is in place, why should Missouri Furnace
complain? It can just buy coke in the spot market and send Cochrane the bill.
How it is any worse off?
Law and economics can answer this question for us. The spot price measure is
systematically overcompensatory. In Missouri Furnace, the seller wanted the spot
price after the fact, but, over the course of many cases and holding everything
else constant, the seller more often favors the forward measure and the buyer the
spot price.
The intuition is not that hard when one takes a step back. Assume we use the
spot price measure. If the seller breaches and the price of coke continues to go
up, the seller takes the entire loss. The seller pays the difference between the
contract price and the market price. This amount just gets bigger as the spot price
of coke rises.
But what if the price moves in the other direction? The seller gets the benefit
of a fall in price only until the spot price falls to the original contract price. As
soon as the spot price falls below the original contract price, the buyer gets all the
benefit of further declines. (In the absence of the breach, in the face of this
decline, the buyer would have to buy coke at the contract price, a price that was
greater than the market price. The seller’s breach frees the buyer from this
obligation.) Under the spot price measure, the seller bears the entire risk if the
price continues to rise, but does not capture the entire benefit when the price
falls.
Let me make the point with a simple example. Before I do, however, I want to
make an aside about methodology. My arithmetic example, consistent with the
spirit of much of law and economics, simplifies things dramatically. We have to
be careful that the assumptions we make do not eliminate the problem that we
want to study. But simplifying assumptions have virtues that can offset this
potential danger.
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By stripping away the unnecessary, we can understand the basic forces at
work much better than we could otherwise. I am going to use examples that
make all sorts of unrealistic assumptions. I am not going to worry about
litigation costs. I am also going to assume that people are risk neutral, even
though I believe most people are risk averse. I do this not because economics
isn’t up to the task, but rather because it isn’t necessary given the points I want to
make.
The question you need to ask is not whether the model is too simple, but
rather whether the basic force that is being identified in the example still remains
in richer environments. Indeed, the single largest vice in modern law and
economics is that we have become so compulsive about taking everything into
account that we get caught up in the mathematics we need to do this. We then
lose
sight
of
the
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transactions we are trying to understand. As Ronald Coase put it:
In my youth it was said that what was too silly to be said may be sung.
In modern economics it may be put into mathematics.3
Let’s look at a simple example. On January 1, you promise to sell me coke at
$15 for delivery on July 1. It is now the end of February. You have decided to
retire and you want to call off the contract. But there is now labor unrest in the
coke industry. For this reason, I cannot find someone else who is willing to sell
July 1 coke for $15.
Let me tell you exactly what the conditions are. If the labor disputes are
resolved and the workers enter a new contract, the price of coke will be $10 on
July 1. But if things do not settle down, mines will shut down and the price of
coke will be $30 on July 1. Either event is equally likely. These possibilities are
reflected in the forward price for coke of $20. ($20 is the average of $10 and $30.)
If you break your contract to sell me coke at $15, what damages should I
recover? How much will it take to put me back into the same situation I was in
before the breach? If others offer the same type of contract you offered me, I can
simply enter into a forward contract. Because I have to promise this new seller
$20 and I promised you only $15, I need $5 in damages to be made whole. ($5 is
the difference between the $20 market price and the $15 contract price.)
But what is my recovery if contract law gives me the difference between the
spot price and the contract price? There is a 50-50 chance that the spot price will
be $30. In that case, I get the difference between $30 and the contract price of $15.
This would give me damages of $15. But let’s consider the other possibility. If the
spot price drops to $10, it is below the contract price. I have not been injured by
your breach. Indeed, you turned out to do me a big favor by breaching. If I still
want coke, I can go out and get it for less than I promised you. I don’t need any
damages to be made whole.
What are my expected damages then if we use the spot market measure? It is
the average of $15 and $0 (or $7.50). An expected damage award of $7.50 is
greater than the $5 I would get if we used the forward contract measure. The
numbers are simple, but there is nothing cooked about them. The effect here is a
quite general one. Over the course of many cases, the buyer is going to get more
under a spot price measure than under the forward price measure. Because the
forward price measure gives the buyer enough money to buy exactly that which
the seller promised, the spot price measure gives the buyer more than is needed
to make the buyer whole.
We should not rush to conclusions. A court might be justified in departing
from the expectation damages principle in a case of anticipatory repudiation. The
3
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spot price may be readily ascertainable and the departure from the expectation
damages principle may be negligible. The chance of the price falling below the
original contract price may be small. Hence, the spot price may be a good
approximation in cases in which the forward price is not available. Moreover,
when the forward price is readily available, we do not need to be as worried
about getting the damages remedy exactly right. In such cases, breach is less
likely. A seller who wanted to retire could, instead of breaching, simply enter
into the futures market and thereby find someone else to perform.
We should not, however, do what the court did in Missouri Furnace. That
court did not recognize that it was departing from the expectation damages
principle. If we want to depart from it, that may be fine, but we want to be aware
of what we are doing. This naturally leads us to the question of whether the
expectation damages rule itself is sensible.
II.
Let us imagine the prototypical contract. I agree to build a machine for you. I
want the deal. I think I can make the machine for less than the contract price. You
want the deal. You think that the machine will bring you more money over the
long haul than the contract price. But none of this is certain. After we enter into
the contract, but before performance, conditions can suddenly change. One of us
may be tempted to breach. Legal rules can give each of us the right set of
incentives. Or, to put it more cautiously, we want to be sure that we do not have
legal rules in place that give us the wrong set of incentives. Let us see exactly
how expectation damages changes the incentives of parties to a contract.
Let’s use another example with stylized facts. We have a buyer who needs a
new machine. Buyer could build the machine itself, but Seller has more expertise.
It can build a better machine more cheaply. Buyer agrees to buy the machine for
$125. Buyer is excited about getting the machine, because over the course of its
life the machine will produce an extra $200 in income for Buyer. Buyer is going to
be $75 richer with this machine than without it.
Seller is also happy with this deal. Seller believes it will cost about $100 to
make the machine. It could cost more and it could cost less. Seller does not find
out how much it will cost to make the machine until just before the time comes to
build it, but on average Seller’s profits on the deal will equal the difference
between the $125 purchase price and the expected cost of $100. Seller’s expected
profit, in other words, is $25.
What is going to happen if the cost of building the machine suddenly rises?
The machine turns out to cost $175. The contract is now a losing deal for Seller. If
Seller performs, Seller will spend $175 building the machine and will get only
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$125 in return. But the machine is still worth building. The cost of the machine is
still less than the $200 it is worth to Buyer.
We want Seller to take account of the loss Buyer will suffer when it is
deciding whether to perform. How can we do this? How can we make Seller
compare the cost of the machine to it against the benefits of the machine to
Buyer? The answer is that we can use expectation damages.
Let’s see how this works. Remember expectation damages. If Seller breaches,
Seller has to make Buyer whole. Seller has to pay damages equal to the value of
the machine to Buyer (or $200) less the contract price of $125. By contrast, if Seller
performs, it incurs the costs of building the machine ($175), but Buyer pays it for
the machine and Seller receives $125. When Seller thinks about breach, it will
compare these two amounts: On the one hand, the value of the machine, less the
contract price ($200 minus $125); on the other, Seller’s cost, less the contract price
($175 minus $125).
The relationship between these two amounts does not change if we ignore the
contract price, the $125, on both sides of the equation. Hence, under expectation
damages, Seller is effectively comparing the $200 value of the machine to Buyer
against its costs of $175. Seller won’t breach because $200 is greater than $175.
Under expectation damages, Seller is forced to internalize the benefit Buyer gets
from the machine and to compare this benefit against its own costs.
Expectation damages forces someone who contemplates breaking a promise
to take account of the harm others will suffer in the event of breach. One of the
things legal rules can do is force people to internalize costs. We see legal rules
with this feature everywhere from tort law to the law of agency.
Expectation damages also has the virtue of being informationally
parsimonious. Expectation damages forces Seller to take account of the harm to
Buyer when its own costs rise, but it does not require the court to measure
Seller’s costs. The court needs to know only the value of the machine to Buyer,
not the costs to Seller of making it.
This rule, of course, doesn’t overcome all our informational problems. The
benefit Buyer enjoys from the machine may be hard to determine. Note,
however, that it is exactly in those cases that determining Buyer’s benefit is
hard—when the goods are unique and have a great deal of subjective value—
that we typically do not have a rule of expectation damages at common law, but
rather the remedy of specific performance.
III.
The account I have given of contract damages so far, however, is incomplete.
We must remember one of the central lessons of The Problem of Social Cost: It takes
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two to tango.4 So far we have looked at how expectation damages affects the
behavior of Seller. We must also ask how expectation damages affects the
behavior of Buyer.5
Before we assumed that the new machine would be worth $200 regardless of
what Buyer did. But this is too simple. After Buyer and Seller sign the contract,
but before Seller builds the machine, Buyer may have the chance to spend money
in anticipation of the delivery of the machine. For example, Buyer might begin
training its workers to operate this particular machine so full advantage can be
taken of the machine from the moment it arrives.
Let me offer a variation on our example to show how this complicates
matters. Let’s assume that the machine is worth $200 if Buyer makes no
preparations. But the machine is worth $240 if Buyer spends $35 training workers
to operate this particular model before the machine is delivered. These training
costs are entirely wasted if Seller does not perform.
Let us first ask what damages Seller must pay under an expectation damages
regime. When Buyer spends $35 preparing for the performance, the value of the
machine, under our assumptions, will be $240. Buyer gets a $240 benefit less the
$125 contract price when Seller performs. Similarly, under a damage measure
that puts Buyer in the same position as when Seller makes the machine, Seller
must, when it breaches, pay the difference between $240 and the contract price of
$125.
In all cases, the $35 investment in preparations increases what Buyer receives
by $40. (Either the value of the performance increases by this amount or the
damage recovery increases by this amount.) Hence, under expectation damages,
Buyer will always train the workers before the machine arrives.
Do we want Buyer to do this, however? It is not obvious. If we are certain that
building the machine makes sense and certain that Seller is going to perform,
then we want Buyer to make this investment. The $35 in training costs brings a
$40 benefit. There is a net gain of $5. But Seller is not always going to perform.
Let us assume that there is a 25% chance that it will cost so much to make the
machine that it will not make sense to build it. Seller would rather pay
expectation damages than perform. If the machine is going to be built only 75% of
the time, Buyer should discount the $40 benefit accordingly. Preparations are
4

See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
The pathbreaking work that analyzes the incentives of both parties to a contract is Steven
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work closely in both this section and the next. Here, as elsewhere, there are complications that
can be introduced into the analysis. See, e.g., David D. Friedman, An Economic Analysis of
Alternative Damage Rules for Breach of Contract, 32 J. Law & Econ. 281 (1989).
5
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worth $30 if the machine is built 75% of the time. Because training costs $35, it is
not worth doing if it gives an expected benefit of only $30.
Expectation damages gives Buyer the incentive to invest too much in
preparing for performance. Expectation damages induces Buyer to treat
performance as a sure thing. This is wrong. If Buyer were making the machine
itself, it would take into account the possibility that it might not acquire the
machine and make the decision about training the workers accordingly.
Ideally, a damage measure should induce both Seller and Buyer to behave
optimally, just as the ideal tort rule should induce the injurer and the victim to
take due care. Can we modify expectation damages to take this into account?
There is such a rule.6 We could limit the amount of preparation costs that Buyer
can recover. We could instruct a court to identify the optimal amount that Buyer
should have spent preparing for the new machine. The court could then calculate
the value of the machine to Buyer if it had invested this amount. It would then
award Buyer the difference between this amount and the contract price.
This rule, however, sacrifices a major benefit of expectation damages. A rule
that requires a court to determine the optimal level of preparation is not
informationally parsimonious. A damage measure that gives the correct
incentives is not any good if a court has no way to calculate it.
IV.
So far we have seen that expectation damages does not give both Buyer and
Seller the correct set of incentives, but is there any other rule that we can
implement that is better? What about reliance damages? When we reward
reliance damages, we award Buyer that amount of money necessary to put Buyer
back in the position it would have been in if it had never entered into the
contract. Reliance damages is the measure most commonly compared to expectation damages. Let’s see how it affects the incentives of Seller and Buyer.
Let’s first look at how reliance damages affects Seller’s incentives. Under the
reliance damage measure, Seller does not have to compensate Buyer for the
value of the promise that has been broken. Buyer recovers only her out-of-pocket
costs.
Let’s see how reliance damages affects Seller’s incentives in our example.
When Seller breaches, it saves the $175 costs of building the machine. By contrast,
when Seller performs, it enjoys the purchase price $125 and it avoids having to
compensate Buyer for the $35 preparation costs. This is $160. Seller compares
$175 to $160 and is therefore tempted to breach.
6
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Note how this comparison under a reliance-based regime differs from the one
Seller does under an expectation-based regime. The benchmark against which
Seller compares its $175 costs in an expectation-damages regime is the value of
the performance to Buyer ($240 in our example). The comparable benchmark in a
reliance-based regime is the contract price and the amount spent in preparation
($160 in our example).
Note that the expectation benchmark is going to be consistently greater than
the reliance benchmark. We are dealing with situations in which Buyer wants
Seller to perform. This means that the machine brings Buyer a net benefit. For
this reason, it must be that the value of the machine to Buyer is greater than what
Buyer has to give up to get it. The value of the machine, the benchmark for
expectation damages, is higher than contract price plus preparation costs, the
benchmark for reliance damages.
As our example showed, costs of building the machine can be high enough to
give Seller an incentive to breach under reliance damages, but not so high that
Seller would breach in an expectations-based regime. Because Seller fully
internalizes the costs of breach to Buyer under expectation damages, it follows
that Seller is not fully internalizing them under reliance damages. Therefore, under reliance damages Seller does not take full account of the harm that Buyer will
suffer in the event of breach.
But what is the effect of reliance damages on Buyer’s incentives? Do reliancebased damages work better here than expectation damages?7 Remember the
problem with Buyer’s incentives under expectation damages. Buyer prepares for
performance as if performance were certain. Buyer spends $35 for something that
has an expected benefit of only $30.
What does Buyer do under reliance damages? Buyer doesn’t look at what
happens when Seller breaches in calculating how much to invest in preparations.
Buyer gets the $35 back in damages. Whenever Seller breaches, the money spent
in preparation will be recovered.
Buyer therefore focuses on those cases in which Seller makes the machine and
invests in preparations on the assumption that Seller will perform. Looked at
from this point of view, Buyer will compare the $40 benefit with the $35 cost. But
this is a bad idea. Because Buyer is fully compensated for preparation costs if
Seller breaches, Buyer does not take the possibility that Seller will breach into account when deciding how much to invest in preparation.
We face exactly the same bad incentive as under expectation damages. Buyer
makes investment in preparation as if performance were always going to happen
7

For the classic discussion of expectation and reliance damages, see Lon Fuller & William R.
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even though it will not. Reliance damages are worse than expectation damages as
far as the incentives it gives Seller and no better in the incentives it gives Buyer.
Indeed, things are worse than this. There is another effect that we need to take
into account.
In an expectation damages world, Buyer does not care whether Seller builds
the machine. In theory, Buyer gets the same amount in all states of the world. But
when Seller breaches in a reliance-based regime, Buyer loses out. Buyer loses a
winning deal, a bargain in which it gets a machine that is worth more than the
purchase price and preparation costs. Buyer would like to do something to
encourage Seller to perform. Is there anything that Buyer can do?
There is. Remember that, under a reliance damages regime, Seller is going to
breach when its cost of making the machine is greater than Buyer’s preparation
costs and the contract price. Buyer can influence Seller’s decision about whether
to make the machine (and increase the chance of getting a winning deal) by
increasing the amount it invests in preparation.
As long as Buyer spends over $50 in preparation, Seller will perform when its
costs are $175. Seller prefers to incur costs of $175 and get paid $125 (for a loss of
$50) rather than repay Buyer’s preparation costs of a greater amount. From
Buyer’s perspective, the additional preparation costs may be a good deal. It
spends an extra $15 and ensures it gets a machine that it values a lot rather than a
damage remedy that leaves it no better than when it started.
By increasing the investment in preparation, Buyer makes it less likely that
Seller’s manufacturing costs exceed the sum of the purchase price and Buyer’s
preparation costs. The more Buyer spends preparing for performance, the more
likely that Seller will be better off making the machine rather than breaching.
Buyer does not make unlimited investments in preparation. After all, Seller
will ordinarily make the machine and too much spent on preparing will cut
down on Buyer’s profits when Seller performs. But some additional expenditures
on preparation, even though they don’t bring a dollar for dollar increase in the
value of the machine, are worth incurring from Buyer’s perspective. Reliance
damages gives Seller a bad incentive that was not there under expectation
damages. Moreover, reliance damages gives Buyer an even worse set of
incentives than expectation damages.
I have sketched all this out in very broad strokes. Steven Shavell, Kathy Spier,
and others have explored this problem carefully. There are many complications,
but the bottom line is pretty clear. Over two important dimensions—the
incentives they give to Buyer and Seller respectively—reliance damages are
unambiguously worse than expectation damages.
One cannot simply assume that expectation damages are therefore better than
reliance damages. For example, reliance damages may be much easier to measure
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than expectation damages and in many instances reliance damages are an
excellent proxy for expectation damages. But this way of looking at contract
damages by looking at a model with very few elements tells us that using
reliance damages comes at a cost.
V.
We should be careful about pursuing this mode of analysis too far, however.
We have to remember another lesson of The Problem of Social Cost. We cannot
make sense of legal rules without taking into account the frictions that exist in
our world. We live in a world in which transaction costs are everywhere. Thus
far, the account I have given of contract damages abstracts from transaction
costs. We are bound to gain additional insights if we make an effort to take these
into account. Let me spend a little time focusing on how we might do this by
drawing on the work of Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner.8
Recall the facts of Hadley v. Baxendale.9 In that case, a miller contracted with a
carrier to transport a broken shaft from Gloucester to Greenwich. The shipment
was delayed. The miller sued and the court had to decide whether the carrier
should be liable for the profits lost for the increased time the mill was shut down.
The court ruled that the miller could not recover the profits lost from the delay.
The miller had not even told the carrier about its special needs. These damages
from delay were not “reasonably foreseeable.” Modern contract law continues to
embrace this rule that a person is not entitled to its consequential damages when
those damages are not reasonably foreseeable.
Let’s see if we can identify the effects that this rule has. First, it is possible that
there is relatively little that the carrier can do to prevent delays, but there is a lot
that the miller can do to prevent the harm that can come from delay. A miller, for
example, could have a back-up shaft. It is easier for a miller to have a back-up
mill shaft than for a carrier to see that nothing gets delayed.
We want a legal rule to induce the person who can take steps to avoid the
harm to have the incentive to do so. The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale may have this
effect. I go to the Himalayas with one of those drug store cardboard cameras. The
pictures of me on top of Mt. Everest do not come out. Can I get my money back
plus the costs of a new trip? The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale tells me that I cannot.
I am much better able to buy more suitable equipment that is less likely to fail
than the drug store is able to ensure that the cardboard camera it sells me works.
8

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989). For a critique of their work, see Jason Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615 (1990).
9 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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My damages—the cost of mounting an expedition to Mt. Everest—are not
reasonably foreseeable.
But it is not clear this story does a good job of explaining Hadley v. Baxendale.
It is worth remembering the source of delay in the actual case. The case arose in
the 1850s. The economy was in transition between transport by canal and
transport by rail. The carrier had a choice—to send the mill shaft by canal boat or
train—and it made the wrong decision given the miller’s need for speed. Hadley
was a situation in which the carrier, unlike the drug store, could have prevented
the harm if it had known about the miller’s special needs.
Second, the court suggests that it might have decided the case differently if
the miller had told the carrier about the need for speed. For this reason, it may
make sense to ask if we can understand the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale by looking
explicitly at a transaction cost—the need for the miller to communicate
information to the carrier.
Let’s pursue the idea that contract law may provide default rules that induce
the miller to disclose information. Once again, we can identify a force that might
be at work by giving a simple example. There are two types of millers. One type
of miller is low-damage. If Carrier fails to deliver the shaft on time, the lowdamage miller will suffer damages of $100. The other type of miller is highdamage. These millers suffer $1000 in damages if Carrier fails to deliver the shaft
on time. Carrier knows that 90% of the millers are low-damage and that 10% are
high-damage, but has no way of telling one type from the other.
There are two ways to ship a shaft—by rail or by canal. Shipping by canal
costs $10. Shipping by rail costs $15. When you ship by canal, there is a 1%
chance of delay. When you ship by rail, there is no chance of delay. There is
otherwise no difference between the two forms of transportation. It costs a miller
$2 to contract around whatever legal rule we put in place.
What is going to happen if the Hadley legal rule is in effect? In the event of a
delay, the carrier has to pay $100 in damages, regardless of the type of miller the
carrier faces. In the absence of a special deal, Carrier ships by canal. It costs
Carrier $10 to ship the mill shaft and Carrier expects to pay $100 in damages 1%
of the time. Carrier therefore charges everyone $11.
The low-damage millers are fully compensated if there is a delay and they get
their mill shafts shipped at Carrier’s cost. It makes sense for Carrier to use the
canal boat and pay $100 in damages one time in a hundred, than spend $5 extra
for rail shipment each time to eliminate delay entirely.
What about the high-damage millers? If they say nothing and there is a delay,
they will lose $1000 and recover only $100. This $900 loss happens 1% of the
time, so they face expected damages of $9 in addition to the $11 they spend on
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shipping. Their total costs under this rule are $20 when their mill shafts are
shipped by canal.
High-damage millers are better off identifying themselves as high-damage
millers and having the shaft shipped by rail. High-damage millers would rather
spend $2 negotiating a special deal and paying $15 for shipping by rail, than
living with the status quo.
Under the Hadley rule, we have a good outcome. The appropriate mode of
transportation is used for each type of miller. The $5 extra cost of shipping by rail
is justified when there is a 1% risk of $1,000 loss, but not when there is a 1%
chance of a $100 loss. In addition, we spend $2 opting out of the default rule only
10% of the time, so transaction costs are at a minimum.
Do we get the same result under a consequential damages rule? If Carrier
shipped all mill shafts by canal, it would pay damages of $1000 in one time in a
thousand and $100 in nine times in a thousand. Total damages would be $1900
over the course of 1,000 cases, so expected damages in a single case are therefore
$1.90. Given that shipping by canal costs $10, total expected transportation costs
for each miller are $11.90.
Under the consequential damages regime, Carrier is better off shipping by
canal than by rail if no one opts out and bargains for a special deal. The $5 extra
costs in shipping by rail is greater than the extra damages Carrier expects from
shipping by canal boat. Carrier would prefer to face costs of $11.90, rather than
costs of $15.
Does anyone opt out when we have the consequential damages rule in place?
Let’s see how each type of miller responds. The high-damage miller is happy to
pay $11.90 and be treated the same as the low-damage millers. The high-damage
miller is completely compensated in the event of delay. It is better off than it
would be if it identified itself as a high-damage miller and had the mill shaft
shipped by rail. If the high-damage miller did this, he would pay $15 rather than
$11.90.
The low-damage millers would like to bargain for a different deal. They are
paying $11.90 for a service that costs only $11 to provide. They are subsidizing
the high-damage millers. They would be better off if they could agree ahead of
time to limit their damages to $100. If they could do this, the carrier would
provide them with the service for $11 rather than $11.90. But the low-damage
millers can’t do this, because it costs them $2 to negotiate a special deal. The $0.90
saved from the new deal does not offset the $2 transaction cost associated with
opting out of the legal rule.
The Hadley foreseeable damages rule, unlike the consequential damages rule,
allows the millers to sort themselves by type. In this example, it brings about a
better outcome because Carrier uses the mode of shipping that is most
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appropriate for each type of miller. The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale forces one
party to disclose information to another in way that the alternative rule would
not.
The optimal contract default rule cannot focus merely on the bargain parties
would strike in a world of no transaction costs. Our contract rules should bear in
mind that parties may opt out of them and we need to pay attention to the
transaction costs associated with opting out.
Once again, we have to be careful not to draw too many inferences from this
example. This example identifies a force that we need to take into account in
trying to understand how legal rules work. One cannot, however, use this highly
stylized story to make a general point about the law that should govern carriers
or anyone else. After all, someone who wants to ship a package quickly today
goes to a carrier that specializes in overnight delivery. Millers with special needs
sort themselves by going to a different type of carrier. There is no need for a legal
rule to induce separation.
Once a market develops and specialized providers of services emerge, we can
often see contract provisions that are tailored made to the transaction. We should
expect these provisions to depart from the default rules that contract law
provides. (And, indeed, the contracts of carriers like Federal Express do not use
either of the terms we have discussed. Instead, they provide that the carrier is not
liable for any consequential damages in the event of a delay.)
Legal rules matter most, not in highly developed markets like the one that
exists today for overnight shipping, but in places where commercial practices are
still evolving. In this environment, information asymmetries and transaction
costs may be quite high. It is here that the information-shifting properties of
contract default rules should be studied.
VI.
The work that has been done on the law and economics of contracts is
enormous and its achievement substantial. We now have a solid understanding
of the way in which contract rules operate. They keep us from wandering astray.
For example, they tell us that, given its own starting assumptions, the court in
Missouri Furnace was wrong. They can identify a way in which reliance damages
are unambiguously inferior to expectation damages. They can force us to
recognize the different ways in which legal rules operate in a world in which
transaction costs are high.
Nevertheless, there is still much work that remains to be done. Contract law
operates in a world in which there are many other forces at work—such as
custom and reputation. It is one thing to understand the effects that different
rules of contract damages have. It is quite another to understand how these rules
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interact with other forces at work in a contractual relationship. Integrating the
effects of law into the rest of the picture is the next challenge that we face and it is
one that will surely begin, like all other quests in law and economics, with a focus
on transaction costs.
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